The Frozen KBO Trade Market… The Second Draft Must Become a Breakthrough for Player Movement [Ryu Sun-kyu’s Bizball]

*This content was translated by AI.

On July 31 and August 4 (Korean time) at 7 a.m., both the KBO League and Major League Baseball (MLB), which reached their respective trade deadline deadlines, displayed a stark temperature difference in their trade markets.

In MLB, major deals continued until just before the deadline. The Los Angeles Dodgers, who won the World Series for two consecutive years, stunned the baseball world by acquiring left-handed pitcher Tarik Skubal, a two-time American League (AL) Cy Young Award winner from the Detroit Tigers, in a blockbuster trade. Instead of taking Skubal, who will become a free agent (FA) after this season, the Dodgers gave up three promising prospects. This was a decisive move aimed at securing their third consecutive World Series title.

In contrast, the KBO League saw no further trades after the reciprocal deal between Hanwha infielder Ha Ju-seok and KIA bullpen pitcher Lee Hyung-beom on July 23. Even on the July 31 deadline, not a single trade was finalized, and the market quietly closed its doors.

The KBO League’s trade market continues to shrink year after year. Looking at the number of completed trades in the 2020s: from 2020 to 2022, nine trades were conducted each year; in 2023, eight trades; in 2024, nine trades; and last year, six trades. However, this year, only three trades were completed by the deadline.

An interesting trend emerged after the allowance of trading first-round draft rights. Since 2020, the KBO has permitted clubs to use first-round draft picks as trade assets. Trades involving such picks totaled one in 2020, two in 2021, four in 2022, four in 2023, three in 2024, and three last year. First-round draft picks have played a significant role in bridging value gaps between players and increasing the likelihood of deal completion. In fact, when two clubs had differing valuations of desired players, first-round picks often helped narrow the negotiation gap.

However, this year saw not a single trade involving first-round draft picks. Not only did overall trades decline, but the use of first-round picks—a key facilitator in closing deals—also came to a standstill. This suggests that clubs have adopted an even more cautious stance toward trades themselves.

While expecting blockbuster trades featuring star players like those seen in MLB may be unrealistic, there is a clear need for more active trading of non-starting-level players. Such moves would provide new opportunities for players who are not getting playing time and allow clubs to bolster their rosters where needed. Yet, the current atmosphere within the KBO League remains highly cautious even regarding trades of non-starters. Meanwhile, many veteran players whose first-team playing opportunities have diminished with their original teams are seeking transfers to clubs where they have a higher chance of appearing in games. If trades remain inactive, there is an urgent need to consider alternative institutional mechanisms to facilitate player movement.

One such alternative is the second draft.

The second draft was first introduced in 2012 and operated on a biennial basis until 2020. Under this system, each club conducted drafts targeting players other than protected ones, offering a pathway for non-starting-level players who lacked playing opportunities to find chances with new teams. However, as some clubs repeatedly chose not to select even a single player, doubts arose regarding the system’s effectiveness, leading to its eventual abolition. Although the Futures FA system was later introduced as a replacement, it failed to sufficiently activate player movement. Consequently, evaluations favoring the second draft as a more effective mechanism gained traction, prompting its revival in 2024. Following the biennial schedule, it was also implemented this year.

However, even the revived second draft cannot be considered sufficiently activated as a channel for player movement. In the 2026 second draft, nine clubs passed on exercising their total of 18 draft rights without making any selections. Under the second draft rules, each of the three lowest-ranked teams in the season receives five draft picks, while the remaining seven clubs receive three picks each, totaling 36 picks across the league. Half of these—18 picks—went unclaimed. NC, Hanwha, and LG each forfeited all three of their allocated picks, while Lotte was the only club to use all three of its picks. The fact that half of all available picks remained unused indicates that clubs found little appeal in the players offered in the second draft market.

There is also room to consider that institutional changes narrowing the scope of eligible players for selection contributed to this outcome. On March 25, 2025, the Korea Baseball Organization (KBO) partially revised its second draft implementation plan. Previously, players in their first to third years with a club, development players, military reserve players, and development military reserve players were automatically excluded from eligibility. The revision expanded automatic protection to include players in their fourth year with a club—whether regular or development—who had prior military reserve or development military reserve status. This change aimed to provide additional protection for players whose original clubs lacked sufficient time to develop them due to military service obligations.

From the perspective of the original club, this is a reasonable measure that ensures adequate time for player development. However, from the standpoint of the second draft, it has resulted in a thinner pool of eligible players. It is difficult to view the phenomenon of 18 consecutive passes in the 2026 second draft as entirely unrelated to these changes.

In the KBO League’s increasingly shrinking trade market, for the second draft to function as a practical alternative for player movement, the system must be adjusted to ensure that “players worth selecting” can enter the market. If the focus remains solely on protecting players for their original clubs, the competitiveness of eligible players will decline, and the repeated occurrence of clubs forfeiting their draft picks is highly likely.

One possible approach would be to expand the automatic protection category to include players in their first through fifth years with a club, while simultaneously reducing the number of additional protected players that clubs may designate from the current 35 to around 25. This would guarantee sufficient development time for younger players while enabling more veteran players—who struggle to secure playing opportunities with their original teams—to enter the second draft market. Additionally, there is a need to consider implementing the second draft annually rather than on a biennial basis. To uphold the system’s purpose of providing new opportunities for players, it is essential not only to broaden the pool of movable players but also to increase the frequency of opportunities themselves.

As trades become increasingly difficult in the KBO League, channels for player movement must not narrow further. The second draft must serve as a “chance for redemption” for veteran and non-starting players, requiring the establishment of a new balance between protecting players for their original clubs and preserving opportunities for player mobility.

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*This content was translated by AI.