The hidden costs behind the nation's sports festival: the uncomfortable truth of World Cup broadcasting rights

*This content was translated by AI.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup in North America can now be watched on terrestrial broadcasters. With KBS confirmed to join existing rights holder JTBC, the path is open for all citizens to enjoy the World Cup without exclusion. While it is regrettable that MBC and SBS, two of the three terrestrial broadcasters, ultimately did not participate, the mere involvement of public broadcaster KBS allows for a positive assessment in terms of fostering World Cup atmosphere and accessibility.

However, there is clearly an uncomfortable point in interpreting this outcome solely as "securing public interest and universal viewing rights." The essence of this incident lies not in the expansion of accessibility, but in the distorted market structure and overheated competition revealed in the process.

■ Excessive risk revealed by the numbers

The core of this broadcasting rights negotiation is price. According to industry sources, JTBC is estimated to have secured the World Cup broadcasting rights at approximately $125 million (about 186.1 billion won at Hanwha's rate). Considering the domestic market size and advertising revenue structure, this is a highly aggressive bet. Some analyses suggest that including actual production costs, the total exceeds 200 billion won.

Originally, JTBC planned to distribute costs through a consortium with terrestrial broadcasters or by reselling rights. In fact, it sold some broadcasting rights to the online platform Naver, with industry estimates placing the scale at up to about 40 billion won. It is also reported that JTBC had expected terrestrial broadcasters to shoulder a share of around 70 billion won.

However, in the end, KBS participated only to a limited extent at around 14 billion won, creating a structure where JTBC had to bear a significant portion of the costs. Consequently, the risk JTBC must bear, which will vary depending on variables such as the national team's performance, is being discussed as potentially ranging from hundreds of billions to as much as 1 trillion won in potential losses. This indicates not merely a failed negotiation, but that the market structure itself was designed from the outset to generate excessive risk.

■ The essence of the broadcasting rights market: not content, but a core commercial revenue source

In the international sports market, broadcasting rights are no longer simple content. They are a rights business and a core revenue source on a global scale.

Both FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) derive the largest share of their revenue structure from broadcasting rights. Based on recent figures, the IOC secures approximately 60% of its Olympic revenue from broadcasting rights, while FIFA secures about 40% based on the 2023–2026 cycle.

This means these organizations are not only event operators but also, in effect, entities selling global media rights. While they emphasize sports value and public interest on the surface, they actually operate a structure that sells "scarce content" at the highest possible price. Their nature as commercial rights sellers is very strong. And in this market, price is determined not by rationality but by the intensity of competition.

The same logic explains why FIFA President Gianni Infantino, immediately after being elected head of the international football community in 2016, expanded the number of World Cup participating countries to 48. This was not merely a policy to expand sports, but a strategic decision to increase the potential for entry into huge markets such as China and India, thereby maximizing the value of broadcasting rights. Had China qualified for this World Cup, FIFA's broadcasting rights revenue would have increased enormously, considering its population size and symbolic significance. Ultimately, the price of broadcasting rights is determined by three factors: < participating countries' economic scale × viewing population × intensity of bidding competition >, and once competition begins, prices deviate further from realistic value.

■ Why does domestic competition become a "very dangerous game"?

The most important lesson left by this incident is clear. Competition among domestic broadcasters inevitably becomes not a "zero-sum game" but a "negative-sum game."

While broadcasting rights prices are formed in the global market, cost recovery occurs in the domestic market. In this structure, when domestic operators compete with each other, prices rise and losses remain domestic. Moreover, the current size of the domestic broadcasting advertising market is in the early 3 trillion won range, having shrunk further compared to the early 4 trillion won range of 10 years ago. The structure has become such that advertising revenue alone is insufficient to recover the costs of major sports events.

JTBC's aggressive investment itself can be understood as a market entry strategy for a latecomer. However, the problem lies in what followed. Excessive costs were poured into securing broadcasting rights without sufficient negotiation structures and risk-sharing mechanisms in place, resulting in risks concentrating on one side. Terrestrial broadcasters could also argue that they had no choice but to buy broadcasting rights from JTBC at an extremely high price, but they are not free from responsibility either. The "wait-and-see then choose" strategy may be rational from an individual company's perspective, but in the end, it did not contribute to market stabilization or structural improvement.

■ What is needed is not a "cartel" but an "agreed order"

The argument that this problem should be resolved through government intervention lacks realism. Since broadcasting rights exist within a global free-competition contract structure, price control at the national level is virtually impossible.

However, leaving it entirely to the market is also not a solution. International sports organizations such as FIFA and IOC enjoy, and even encourage, domestic broadcasting rights competition. This is because they can earn more money that way. To avoid falling into such a trap, domestic broadcasters must at least create a level of voluntary order as follows:

(1) Setting realistic price guidelines for international sports broadcasting rights (2) A pre-bidding consultation and information-sharing structure (3) A joint purchasing or diversified investment model to prevent risk from concentrating on specific operators (4) A revenue diversification strategy including collaboration with OTT and digital platforms. This is not collusion, but the minimum "industrial self-regulation" necessary to prevent market collapse.

The World Cup is indeed a festival for all citizens. However, if that festival is sustained above the excessive financial sacrifices of broadcasters due to high broadcasting rights prices, it is not a healthy structure. This broadcasting rights controversy is an incident that, beyond a mere negotiation issue, directly exposes the structural vulnerabilities inherent in the Korean sports media industry.

To ensure that the same debate does not repeat in the next World Cup, we must now change the question. It is no longer "who won the broadcasting rights," but "how can we create a sustainable market structure."

Finding that answer is precisely the most important task left by this incident.

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*This content was translated by AI.