"Is the era of K League clubs serving local citizens now over? Why are as many as 17 out of 29 clubs funded by taxes?" [Lee Jong-seong's Sports Culture & Industry]

*This content was translated by AI.

The sore spot of Korean football is the rapid increase in local government-owned clubs since the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup. Of the 29th professional soccer clubs in the K League's first and second divisions, 17 are now owned by local governments. In 2026, the operating costs for these local government-owned clubs that must be borne by Local Governments will reach 151.1 billion won. This is why K League faces criticism as a "tax league."

Of course, a city-provincial citizen club has the potential to promote the region and revitalize the local economy in the face of an era of regional extinction. However, city-provincial citizen clubs where the mayor or governor serves as the club owner struggle to shed the negative image of the politicization of soccer. In fact, club owners have historically used soccer teams as political leverage. Corruption such as embezzlement of public funds has also occurred in citizen-owned clubs.

Above all, the prevailing view is that city-owned clubs hinder the industrial development of the K League from a long-term perspective. This is because many city-owned clubs struggling with financial difficulties find it difficult to operate in a forward-looking manner.

◆ K League local clubs are the expensive bill of the 2002 World Cup

Looking back, the launch of K League city-based clubs was heavily influenced by external factors. The establishment of K League city-based clubs was a costly bill left behind by the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup, which was illuminated by its quarterfinal miracle. Although ten World Cup stadiums were newly constructed, only five existing professional soccer clubs could use these stadiums as their home grounds.

Amid this, Gwangju Sangmu (now Gwangju FC) and Incheon United were established following Daegu FC, Korea's first professional soccer civic club. This was done primarily to prevent World Cup stadiums from becoming money pits. The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (formerly the Ministry of Culture and Tourism) also introduced support measures for establishing professional sports clubs in 2003, a move closely linked to this issue.

Korean provincial teams created for the purpose of utilizing World Cup stadiums differ in nature from citizen clubs in European football. This is because, unlike Spanish or German football clubs led by socios (members), where citizens hold significant decision-making power over club operations as members, K League provincial teams do not grant such authority to their fans. They are merely "citizen clubs" in name only.

However, if we expand our focus beyond Western Europe to Eastern Europe, professional soccer clubs operating like the community-owned K League teams do exist. Even after the introduction of a capitalist system, these clubs continue to be funded by local government taxes.

◆ The Fate of Polish Civic Clubs Altered by Hosting Euro 2012

Poland serves as a good example. Traditionally, the Polish professional football league was dominated by civic clubs. However, in the past decade, the Polish professional football league has changed significantly. Among the 18th teams belonging to Ekstraklasa (the first division), the number of clubs operated by Local Government has now decreased to just four.

This transformation of the Polish league offers significant implications for the K League. Ultimately, to promote the development and competitiveness of the K League, more private investment in club operations is required.

So, how did the privatization wave in Polish professional football begin? The starting point of this change was the UEFA Euro 2012 tournament, co-hosted by Poland and Ukraine.

At the time, Poland constructed three state-of-the-art soccer stadiums, each capable of accommodating over 40,000 spectators, to host the tournament. Subsequently, clubs in cities that were not host venues for the Euro tournament also rushed to build new stadiums so as not to fall behind in the competition for attracting fans.

However, most Polish football clubs could not afford the massive rental fees incurred by using modern stadiums with a capacity of around 40,000. Although spectator capacity increased by about three times, the number of spectators remained almost the same as in the past. To make matters worse, Polish civic clubs had no revenue model to generate income on days when matches were not held.

The accumulated deficit was a disaster for the civic team. Public dissatisfaction surged over the question: "Why should taxpayers' money be used to cover the civic team's deficits?" In response, local governments cut city budget subsidies and donations intended to support the civic teams, causing the league's competitiveness to plummet. Ultimately, local governments were forced to sell the civic teams to private entities.

◆ European-level stadiums and the reduced value of local citizen clubs

Private investors showed considerable interest in acquiring the Polish civic club. The key reason was that the club's home stadium facilities were among the top-tier in Europe, while the acquisition price of the civic club remained low.

An investment group led by Lukas Podolski, a German football star of Polish descent, along with domestic and foreign private investors, has begun acquiring citizen-owned clubs. Amidst these changes, matchday revenues and broadcasting rights fees in Poland's Ekstraklasa have started to rise.

To elevate the status of Polish football, which had long remained on the periphery of European football, the Polish football community took the lead in establishing the UEFA Conference League. Since its launch for the 2021–2022 season, Polish clubs have consistently achieved strong results in the competition.

The establishment of the Conference League, following the Champions League and Europa League, provided a stage for Polish football clubs to enhance their competitiveness. Thanks to the effects of the Conference League, Poland rose to 10th place in the UEFA league rankings for the 2026–2027 season. This represents a major leap for the Polish league, which was only ranked 21st just three years ago.

Naturally, the average attendance for El Clásico also surged sharply. The league's average attendance for the 2025–2026 season approached 14,000 spectators, an increase of approximately 4,500 compared to a decade ago. League revenue, which had not exceeded 300 billion won in the 2020–2021 season, rose to around 400 billion won last season.

During this period, active marketing efforts by clubs operated by private companies increased daily match-day revenue by approximately tenfold. This change occurred even though local governments still hold the majority of stadium ownership rights, as Polish football teams began directly managing the stadiums through long-term contracts.

The same applies to the K League. Growth momentum for the K League can emerge amid gradual attempts at privatizing city-owned clubs and the spread of structures that allow clubs to directly operate stadiums through long-term contracts.

Above all, there is an urgent need for facility renovations focused on fan experience to enhance spectator satisfaction. Among the 12th K League 1 club home stadiums this season, the most recently opened venue is Incheon Football Stadium (Songdo Arena), which opened in 2012. The home stadiums of the remaining K League 1 clubs were built ahead of the 2002 World Cup. Some stadiums even date back to the 1980s. The explosive growth of the KBO League began over the past 12 years as five of its ten clubs constructed new home stadiums.

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*This content was translated by AI.